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o 
[L. A. No. 25465. In Bank. Nov. 3, I!l;)!).] 
JACK OWENS, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS 
ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; JESSIE THIELE, 
Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Process - Defects and Remedies - Motion to Quash - Man-
"damus.-8ince the enactment of Code Civ. Proc., §§ 416.1-416.3 
in 1955, the appropriate remedy, when a trial court refuses to 
quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction 
over defendant, is a writ of mandate directing the court to 
enter its order quashing service. If the facts justify such 
relief it is immaterial that defendant has prayed for the wrong 
remedy, such as writ of prohibition, and the Supreme Court 
may treat his petition as one for writ of mandate. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Pi"OeeSS, Notices and Papers, § 52. 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Process, § 72; [2, 3, 8, 17] Process, 
§ 28; [4,10] Judgments, § 7(2) j [5] Process, § 27; [6,7,9,12-16] 
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[2] ld.-Service by Publication-- Construction of Statute.-Under 
. Code Civ. Proc., § 417, l"f'l:1t.in~ t.o {hI' pOWf'r of courts to render 
. persQnal jl.idgments against one ovp-r whom jurisdiction was 
acquired on service by publication, where defendant was a 
resident of Arizona at the time a personnl injury action was 
commenced against him in California and at the time of per-
sonal service of summons on him in Arizona, jurisdiction must 
be based on his residence in California at the time the cause 
of action arose. 
[31 ld. - Service by Publica.tion - Construction of Statute. - As 
used in Code Civ. Proc., § 417, relating to the power of courts 
to render personal judgments against one over whom jurisdic-
tion was acquired on service by publication and who was a 
resident of this state at the time the cause of action arose, 
the word "resident" means "domiciliary." 
[41 Judgments-Prerequisites-Judgments on Constructive or Sub-
stituted Service.-The language of Code Civ. Proc., §§ 412, 413, 
declaring that a person who "resides out of the state; or has 
departed from the state; or cannot, after· due diligence, be 
found within the state; or conceals himself to avoid the serv-
ice of summons" is subject to service by publication and that, 
under such circumstances, personal service outside the state 
is "equivalent to publication," is broad enough in its terms to 
authorize a personal judgnlent based on extraterritorial serv-
ice of process either through "pUblication" or "personal serv-
ice" on a defendant outside the state. 
[5] Process-Service by Publica.tion-Statutory Provisions. - The 
operation of Code Civ. Proc., § 417 (as originally enacted in 
1951), providing for personal service and personal judgment 
against a nonresident where jurisdiction has been acquired by 
publication of summons, being based on the broad authority of 
§§ 412, 413, was made dependent on defendant's residence 
within the st.ate at the time of commencement of the action 
or at the time of service, and on his personal service with 
summons. Such code provision satisfied the requirements of 
procedural due process because no more certain provision for 
defendant's receipt of actual notice of litigation, against him 
could be made than through specified personal service of 
process. 
[6] ld.-Persons Who Ma.y Be Served-Nonresidents. - Though 
amenability to suit in California is a responsibility growing 
out of a defendant's domicile in the state, such responsibility 
does not cease when such domicile ceases where the action is 
commenced before defendant changes his domicile to another 
state. Jurisdiction is justified by plaintiff's interest in being 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Process, Notices and Papers, § 59; Am.Jur., 
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able to conduct his litigation on the basis of thc facts existing 
at the time he must act and on his filing his action where juris-
diction over defendant might be obtained; but the mere fact 
of past domicile in the state would not subject defendant to 
its jurisdiction indefinitely, since a past domicile having no 
relationship to the litigation at hand would not afford reasoll- . 
able basis for the assertion of jurisdiction. 
Id.-Persons Who May Be Served-Nonresidents.-Code Civ. 
Proc., § 417, subd. (b), relating to the power of courts to 
render personal judgments against one over whom jurisdiction 
was acquired on service by publication, requires more than 
past domicile in the state; there must have been domicile here 
at the time the cause of action arose. Since jurisdiction so ! 
based rests neither on an existing relationship nor on the right 
of plaintiff to rely on an existing relationship at the time he : 
commences his action, it may be debatable whether such juris-
diction can constitutionally be assumed in the absence of 'some 
other relevant contacts with the state. 
[8), leL-Service by Publication-Construction of Statute.-Under 
Stats. 1957, ch. 1674, § 2, declaring that if the 1957 amend-
ment of Code Civ. Proc., § 417, extending the power of courts 
to render personal judgments against one absent from the 
state but who was domiciled in the state at the time the cause 
of action arose if he was personally served with process, is held 
invalid such invalidity shall not affect the provisions of § 417 
as they were in force immediately prior to the effective date of 
such amendment, nor affect other provisions or applications 
of such amendment which can be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application, and that in this respect such 
amendment and its provisions "are declared to be severable," 
even if domicile alone at the time the cause of action arose 
does not justify personal jurisdiction pursnant to §§ 412, 413, 
other contacts with the state either alone or together with such 
domicile may fully support such jurisdiction. In such a case, 
the severability clause compels the court to give effect to § 417, 
subd. (b), by exercising jurisdiction pursuant to its terms 
where defendant was domiciled in the state at the time the 
cause of action arose. 
[9) Id.-Persons Who May Be Served-Nonresidents.-In an ac-
tion against a defendant who was domiciled'in California at 
the time a cause of action arose against him in California for 
injuries sustained by plaintiff when she was bitten by defend-
ant's dog in California, though defendant subsequently changed 
his domicile to Arizona, the fact that the cause of action arose 
out of defendant's activities in California, namely, his owner-
ship and possession of the offending dog, is sufficient under the 
due process clause to permit the courts of this state to assert 
personal jurisdiction over him. 
o 
Nov. 1959J OW~;NS t'. SUl'Jo~IU()R (;OURT 
152 C.2d 822; 345 P,2d 9211 
825 
[10] Judgments - Prerequisites - Judgments on Constructive or 
Substituted Service.-The rule that due proce!ls requires that 
in order to subject a defendant to a jUdgment in p"rSotUlm, if 
he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have 
certain minimum contacts with it such that maintenance of 
the suit does not offend against traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice, applies to individuals as well as foreign 
corporations. 
[11] Process - Service on Nonresident Motorists. - Jurisdiction 
over nonresident motorists does not rest on consent but on 
their activity in the state. 
[12] Id.-Per80ns Who May Be Served-Nonresidents.-Though 
the problem of securing jurisdiction over persons who have 
left the state where their activities gave rise to causes of action 
is most acute in the case of the nonresident motorist, assump- I 
tion of jurisdiction is constitutionally justified, not because 
the problem is acute and often arises, but because it is reason-
able and fair to require a defendant whose voluntary acts have 
given rise to a cause of action in a state to litigate his responsi-
bility for that conduct at the place where it occurred. 
[13] Id.-Persons Who May Be Served-Nonresidents.-The ra-
tional basis of the decisions upholding the nonresident motor-
ist statutes is broad enough to include the case in which the 
nonresident defendant causes injury without the intervention 
of any particular instrumentality. The Legislature may direct 
its policy to the fact of injury as well as its probability. 
[14] Id.-Persons Who May Be Served-Nonresidents.-While the 
Legislature has not specifically provided for jurisdiction over 
nonresidents based on the commission of a tortious act within 
the state, it has provided that our courts shall have personal 
jurisdiction pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., §§ 412, 413, to the 
extent constitutionally permissible if the conditions of § 417 
have been met, and those conditions have been met where 
defendant was a resident of the state at the time plaintiff was 
bitten by defendant's dog in this state. The fact that the cause 
of action for such injuries arose out of defendant's activities 
in this state justified the assumption of jurisdiction over him 
by personal service outside the state. 
[15] Id.-Persons Who May Be Served-Nonresidents.-Assuming 
that an activity carried on within the state Out of which n 
cause of action arose must be of some peculiarly dangerous. or 
serious kind to justify an assertion of jurisdiciton over a pel'-
son who has left the state, no such limitation exists if defend-
ant was also domiciled in the state at the time the cause of 
action arose. 
[16] Id.-Persons Who May Be Served-Nonresidents.-Whl'n a 
cause of action arose out of an IIctivity carried on within the 
(J 
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state at 1\ time when defendant WIIS dOlllieilf!d here, the quality 
and nature of the activity in 1·elation to the fair and orderly 
administrat.ion of the laws which it was the purpose of the due 
proc('ss clause t.o insure justifies subjecting def('ndant, who has 
\I:'ft the state, to the jurisdiction of our courts. 
[17] ld.-Service by Publication-Construction of Statute.-Code 
eiv. Proc., § 417, subd. (b), extending the power of courts to 
render personal judgments against one absent from the state 
but who was domiciled in the state at the time the cause of 
action arose if he was personally served with process, permits 
entry of a personal judgment pursuant to service made after 
its effective date, though defendant has established his domicile 
in another state. The statute governs procedure only, since it 
neither creates a new cause of action nor deprives defendant 
of any defense on the merits, and defendant has no vested right , 
to have the jurisdiction of the courts of this state limited as 
it was at the time he left the state. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition, treated as one in mandamus 
to compel the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to enter 
an order quashing service of summons. Writ denied. 
Parker, Stanbury, R~ese & McGee and White McGee, Jr., 
for Petitioner. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Edward A. Nu-
gent, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent. 
Charles F. Legeman for Real Party in Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In January, 1957, plaintiff (real party 
in interest herein) commenced an action against defendant 
(petitioner herein) to recover damages for injuries suffered 
from being bitten by defendant's dog. The cause of action 
arose in California when defendant was a resident here, but 
before the action was commenced, defendant became a per-
manent resident of Arizona. In September, 1958, plaintiff 
secured an order for publication of summons pursuant to 
Code of Civil Procedure, section 412, and defendant was per-
sonally served with summons in Arizona on September 29th. 
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 413.) Defendant appeared specially 
and moved to quash the service of summons on the ground 
that it was ineffective to give the tl'ial court juril;Jictioll ove1' 
bim. The court denied his motion, and he then filed this peti-
tion for a writ of prohibition to prevent further proceedings 
against him. 
o 
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[1] Since Code of Civil Procedure', gec~t.i(lllS 416.i-416.3, 
were enacted in 1955, the appropriate remedy, when a trial 
court refuses to quash service of summons 011 the ground of 
lack of jurisdiction over the defendant, is a writ of mandate 
directiilg the court to enter its order quashing service. (Hart-
ford v. Superior Court, 47 Ca1.2d 447, 451 [304 P.2d 1] ; 
Chesin v. Superior Court, 142 Cal.App.2d 360, 362 [298 P.2<l 
593] ; see 1 Witkin, California Procedure, .Turisdiction, § 81A.) 
If the facts justify such relief it is immaterial that de-
fendant has prayed for the wrong remedy, and we treat his 
petition as one for a writ of mandate. (See Boren v. State 
Personnel Board, 37 Ca1.2d 634, 638 [234 P.2d 981] ; 3 Wit-
kin, California Procedure, pp. 2568-2569.) 
Section 417 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: 
"Where jurisdiction is acquired over a person who is out-
side of this State by publication of summons in accordance 
with Sections 412 and 413, the court shall have the power 
to render a personal judgment against such person only if he 
was personally served with a copy of the summons and com-
plaint, and was a resident of this State (a) at the time of the 
commencement of the action, or (b) at the time that the cause 
of action arose, or (c) at the time of service." 
[2] Since defendant was a resident of Arizona at the 
time the action was commenced and at the time of service, 
jurisdiction under section 417 must be based on his residence 
here at the time the cause of action arose. (Subd. (b).) [3] As 
used in section 417, resident means domiciliary (Smith Y. 
Smith, 45 Cal.2d 235, 240 [288 P.2d 497]), and it is not 
disputed that defendant was a California domiciliary at the 
time the cause of action arose. Defendant contends, however, 
that this fact is not snfficient to permit the state to acquire 
jurisdiction over him by personal service beyond its borders, 
and that, in any event, subdivision (b) is inapplicable in this 
case because it was enacted not only after the cause of action 
arose and after defendant changed his domicile. to Arizona, 
but after the action was commenced. 
[4] In Allen v. Superior Court, 41 Ca1.2d 306 [259 P.2d 
905], we considered the ei'fe('t of section 417 as it was originally 
enacted in 1951. We pointed out that as "long provided by 
California law, a person who' resides out of the state; or has 
depal·ted from the state; or cannot, after due diligence, hI' 
found within tIll' statl': or l'onl'eal~ himsf'lf to avoid thp servic'" 
of slIlllmolls' i..; snhjt'..t. to seI'vice by puhlil'atioll (Code Ci\,. 
() 
~ 
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Pror-_. § 412). Under such circnmstances, personal service out 
side t,he state ill declared to he 'r.ql1ivalent to publication' 
(Ibid, § 413). This statntory language is literally broad 
enough in its terms to authorize a personal judgment based 
on the extraterritorial service of process, either through 
'publication' or 'personal service' on a defendant without the 
state. (See 37 Cal. L. Rev. 80, 84.)" (41 Ca1.2d at 309-310.) 
We then reviewed Penll.()yer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 [24 L.Ed. 
565], setting forth constitutional limitations on such juris-
diction and the subsequent cases, including Milliken v. Meyer, 
311 U.S. 457 [61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278, 132 A.L.R. 1357], 
and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 [66 
S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057], redefining such 
limitations. [5] It was against this background that the 
Legislature enacted section 417, and we concluded that as I 
"so based on the broad authority of sections 412 and 413, 
section 417 is manifestly designed to restrict the power of the 
court if a personal judgment is to be entered. Thus its 
operation is made dependent on defendant's residence within 
the state either at the time of commencement of the action 
or time of service, and on his personal service with sum-
mons." (41 Ca1.2d at 312.) We held that personal jurisdiction 
could constitutionally be based on the defendant's domicile 
here at the time of the commencement of the action, stating: 
"One main objection to service by publication on a person 
residing outside of the state is that due process requires fair 
notice. This was a consideration in Milliken v. Meyer, supra, 
311 U.S. 457, upholding a personal judgment against a domi-
ciliary based on the personal service of process while absent 
from the state. It was there said at page 464: 'One ... incident 
of domicile is amenability to suit within the state even during 
sojourns without the state, where the state has provided and 
employed a reasonable method for apprising such an absent 
party of the proceedings against him.' The same principle on 
analogous reasoning applies where a domiciliary at the time 
of the commencement of the action thereafter changes his 
IItate of residence and is personally served with process in the 
latter state. As a citizen of the state wherein the action was I 
commenced, he had certain responsibilities arising out of his 
relationship to that state by reason of domicile, one of whieh 
was amenability to suit therein. Such relationship and re-
sponsibility based on citizensnip within the state are not 
terminated by his subsequent ~emoval to another state, and 
.. 
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be lUay be served with process pursuant to a method reason-
ably designed to give him notice of the proceedings brought 
against him in the courts of the state of his original domicilc 
prior to his departure therefrom. We therefore conclude that 
section 417 satisfies the requirements of procedural due proc-
eSs, for no more certain provision for defendant's receipt of 
actual notice of the institution of litigation against him could 
be made than through the specified personal service of process. 
(Milliken v. Meyer, supra, 311 U.S. 457, 463; see 40 Cal. L. 
Rev. 156.) " (41 Ca1.2d at 312-313.) 
[6] Defendant contends that since amenability to suit is 
a responsibility growing out of domicile in the state, it ceases 
when such domicile ceases. In the Allen case we held, how-
ever, that it did not cease if the action was commenced before 
the defendant changed his domicile to another state. The 
responsibilities arising out of domicile and its existence at 
the time the action was commenced were held sufficient to 
secure jurisdiction by service outside the· state although the 
defendant had changed his domicile before service was made. 
Such jurisdiction is justified by the plaintiff's interest in 
being able to conduct his litigation on the basis of the facts 
l'xisting at the time he must act. He must file his action 
where jurisdiction over the defendant may be obtained. We 
agree with defendant, however, that the mere fact of past 
domicile in the state would not subject him to its jurisdiction 
indefinitely, for a past domicile having no relationship to the 
litigation at hand would not afford a reasonable basis for an 
assertion of jurisdiction. 
[7] Subdivision (b) of section 417 requires more than past 
domicile in the state. There must have been domicile here at 
the time the cause of action arose. Since jurisdiction so based 
rests neither on an existing relationship nor on the right of 
the plaintiff to rely on an existing relationship at the time 
he commences his action, it may be debatable whether such 
jurisdiction can constitutionally be assumed in the absence of 
some other relevant contacts with the state. If, for example, 
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant were presently domi-
ciled here and the cause of action arose out of the defendant's 
activities elsewhere, the fact standing alone that the defendant 
was domiciled here at the time the cause of action arose might 
be too tenuous R :basis for asserting jurisdiction over him. 
[8] 'l'he Legislature, anticipating such doubtful cases, pro-
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Procedure, enacted at the 1957 General Session of the Legis-
lature, or any provision thereof, or the application thereof, 
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity 
shall not affect the provisions of said Section 417 as they were 
in force immediately prior to the effective date of said amend-
ment nor shall it affect other provisions or applications of said 
amendment which can be given effect without the invalid 
provision or application, and, to this end, and in each such 
respect, said amendment and its provisions are declared to 
be severable." (Stats. 1957, ch. 1674, § 2.) Accordingly, even 
if domicile alone at the time the cause of action arose does not 
justify personal jurisdiction pursuant to sections 412 and 
413, other contacts with the state either alone or together 
with such domicile may fully support such jurisdiction. In 
such a case, the severability clause compels the court to give 
effect to subdivision (b) of section 417 by exercising jurisdic-
tion pursuant to its terms. 
[9] In the present case the cause of action arose out of 
defendant's activities in this state, namely, his mvnership 
and possession of the offending dog. This fact alone is sufficient 
under the due process clause to permit the courts of this state 
to assert personal jurisdiction over him. 
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 
[66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057], the court stated: 
"Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment 
in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the de-
fendant's person. Hence his presence within the territorial 
jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a 
judgment personally binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 
714, 733 [24 L.Ed. 565]. But now that the capia.s ad respond-
endum has given way to personal service of summons or 
other form of notice, due process requires only that in order 
to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not 
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain 
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the 
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice.'" In Henry R. Jahn ~ &m v. Superior 
Court, 49 Ca1.2d 855, 860-861 [323 P.2d 437], we reviewed 
the application of the minimum contacts test and pointed out: 
"In some circumstances there is adequate basis for jurisdiction 
when the defendant has elected to deal with the plaintiff even 
though only by mail. (McGee v. Inte1'lIa"tional Life Ins. Co., 
355 U.S. 220 [78 S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223] ; Panna-lee v. 
o 
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Iowa. Sta.!€. Tmt·rling ;Wpn'.~ A.<.<lI .• 20fl F.2d ;=;18, :122.) Again. 
there is jurisdictioll when the {,RUS{, o( at"! ion arm;(' out of the 
breat·1t or a contract made and to be pcrformed in the state 
(Oompania. De Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals 00., 205 Md. 237 
[107 A.2d 357, 108 A.2d 372, 49 A.L.R.2d 646], eert. den., 3!R 
U.S. 943 [75 S.Ct. 365, 99 L.Ed. 738] ; see also 8. Howes 00. 
v. W. P. Milli1lg 00., (Okla) 277 P.2d 655, 657-658) or 
even out of a mere isolated act in the state by the defendant 
or his agent. (Nelson v. MUler, 11 Ill.2d 378 [143 N.E.2d 673] ; 
Smyth v. Twin State ImprO'l.!ement Oorp., 116 Vt. 569 rSO A.2d 
664, 25 A.L.R.2d 1193] ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 [47 
S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091] ; Johns v. Bay State A.bmsive Prod-
ucts 00., 89 F. Supp. 654.)" [10] The rationale of the Inter-
national Shoe case is not limited to foreign corporations, and 
both its language and the cases sustaining jurisdiction over 
nonresident motorists make clear that the minimum contacts 
test for jurisdiction applies to individuals a.~ well as foreign 
corporations. [11] It is now settled that jurisdiction over 
nonresident motorists does not rest ou consent but 011 their 
activity in the state. (Olberding v. Illinois Oelltl'aZ R. 00.,346 
U.S. 338, 341 [74 S.Ct. 83, 98 L.Ed. 39] ; see also Doherty &'7 
00. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 628 [55 S.Ct. 553, 79 L.Ed. 
1097] ; Allen v. Superior Oourt, 41 Ca1.2d 306, 311-312 [259 
P.2d 905].) 
[12] Defendant contends, however, that the nonresident 
motorists cases stand on a special footing in that a special 
rule is justified by the hazards of motor vehicle operations 
and the likelihood that nonresident motorists will have left 
the state following accidents before service of process can 
be had. It may be conceded that the problem of securing 
jurisdiction over persons who have left the state where their 
activities gave rise to causes of action is most acute in the 
case of the nonresident motorist. Assumption of jurisdiction 
is constitutionally justified, however, not because the problem 
is acute and arises often, but because it is reasonable and fair 
to require a defendant whose voluntary acts have given rise 
to a cause of action in a state to litigate llis responsibility for 
that conduct at the place where it occurred. [13] "The social 
problem resulting from automobile accidents • . . may be of 
greater magnitude than those resulting from other tortiOU!l 
conduct generally; but the determination that the degree of 
need is such as to call for remedy is to be made by the legisla-
ture and not hy the COUl'ts. The rational basis of the decisions 
.. , 
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llpho1cling thl' nonrl'sid"ul motori.st. statutes is broad enough 
10 ine)wle Ihe ('ase in whiC'h the nonresident d('fendant causes 
-injury without the intcrvention oE any particnlar instru-
mentality. The legislature may direct its policy to the fact of 
-injury as well as its probability." (Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 
378, 389 [143 N.E.2d 673].) [14] It is true that our Legis- ! 
lature has not specifically provided for jurisdiction over non-
residents based on the "commission of a tortious act within 
this State" out of which a cause of action arose, as has the 
Illinois Legislature in the statute construed in the Nelson 
case. (11 Ill.2d at 381.) It ha.~ provided, however, that our 
courts shall have personal jurisdiction pursuant to sections 
412 and 413 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the extent con-
stitutionally permissible if tlle conditions of section 417 are 
met. The conditions of section 417 have been met in this 
case, and the fact that the cause of action arose out of de-
fendant's activities here fully justifies the assumption of 
jurisdiction over him by personal service' outside the state. 
[15] Even if ,ve were to assume that an activity carried 
on within the state out of which the cause of action arose 
must be of some peculiarly dangerous or serious kind to justify 
an assertion of jurisdiction, no such limitation exists if the 
defendant was also domiciled in the state at the time the cause 
of action arose. [16] When, as in this case, the cause of 
action arose here out of an activity carried on here at a time 
when defendant was domiciled here, "the quality and nature 
of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administra-
tion of the laws which it was the purpose of the due proces.~ 
clause to insure" (International Shoe 00. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310, 319 [66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057]) 
fully justifies subjecting defendant to the jurisdiction of our 
courts. (Henry R. Jahn &- Son v. Superior Oourt, 49 Ca1.2d 
855, 862 [323 P.2d 437] ; Oarl F. W. Borgward, O.M.B.H. v. 
Superior Oourt, 51 Ca1.2d 72, 79 [330 P.2d 789].) 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 [78 8.0t. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 
1283], and May v. _4ndel'son, 345 U.S. 528 [73 S.Ct. 840, 97 
L.Ed. 1221], are not to the contrary. In Hansf)n v. Denckla 
the court did not depart from the minimum contact test but 
pointed out that the defendant had done no act in the state 
that would justify an assumption of jurisdiction over it. (357 
U.S. at 251.) In May v. Anderson the court did not consider 
whether personal jurisdiction could be based on past contacts 
with the state, for it was apparently conceded that the child 
(·ustody decree in question was entered withont personal jlll-is-
.. _,.., 
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did inn nn~r the mnthl'T al111 1\11'1"1' WHS 110 st HtlltE' llut.bori7.1ng 
:-;C'rvieC' oulf'iilC' t.he statc in slwh Pl·O'·PNlilll!s. 
[17] There is no merit in defendant's contention that sub-
division (b) is inapplicable 011 the ground that it was enacted 
after the action was filed and he had established his domicile in 
Arizona. Plaintiff does not rely on that subdivision to validate 
a service attempted before it became effective, but to permit an 
assumption of jurisdiction permitted by the !!tatute at the time I 
service was made. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 416.) The statute 
governs procedure only, for it neither creates a new cause of 
action nor deprives defendant of any defense on the merits, 
and defendant has no vested right to have the jurisdiction of 
the courts of this state limited as it was at the time he left the 
state. Accordingly, subdivision (b) permits entry of a per-
sonal judgment pursuant to service made after its effective 
date. (Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 71 [69 S.Ct. 944, 93 
L.Ed. 1207] ; Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541, 544 [69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528] ; Norton v. City 
of Pomona, 5 Ca1.2d 54, 65-66 [53 P.2d 952] ; San Bernat'dino 
C01('nty v. Industr'ial Acc. Com., 217 Cal. 618, 628-630 [20 
P.2d 673] ; McChtrg v. McClurg, 212 Cal. 15, 18 [297 P. 27] ; 
Rice v. Dunlap, 205 Cal. 133, 137 [270 P. 196]; Olivas v. 
Weiner, 127 Cal.App.2d 597, 600-601 [274 P.2d 476] ; Cali-
fornia Emp. etc. Com. v. Smilcage Co., 68 Cal.App.2d 249, 
252 [156 P.2d 454] ; see Aetna Cas. &- Surety Co. v. Industrial 
Ace. Com., 30 Cal.2d 388, 393-395 [182 P.2d 159]; Allen v. 
SuperWr Court, 41 Cal.2d 306, 313 [259 P.2d 905].) 
The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ 
denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., Peters, J., aud Peek, J. pro tem.,· 
concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would issue the peremptory 
writ of mandate directing respondent court to vacate its order 
denying petitioner's motion to quash service of summons and 
to enter its order grauting the motion, for the reasons stated 
by Mr. Justice Nourse in the opinion prepared by him for 
the District Court of Appeal in Owe11s v. Supef"ior Court (Cal. 
App.), 338 P.2d 465. 
Schauer, J., concurred . 
• As~jglled by Chninn:t11 of Judicial ~oun .. i1. 
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